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Abstract This paper examines leadership, elite capture and cor-
ruption in two villages in Sumatra. It compares implementation
and outcomes of several conservation and development projects in
the context of democratization and decentralization reforms intro-
duced in Indonesia since 1998. In examining aspects of elite con-
trol and elite capture, this paper focuses on the activities of local
elites, particularly village officials, who use their positions to mo-
nopolize planning andmanagement of projects that were explicitly
intended to incorporate participatory and accountability features.
While elites’ use of authority and influence to benefit personally
from their roles clearly reflects elite capture, there are nonetheless
members of elite groups in these case studies who use their control
of projects to broad community benefit. In both villages there is
considerable friction between villagers and elites as well as among
members of the local elite themselves over control of local re-
sources. Differences in the structure of these cross-cutting internal
relationships and of ties between local authorities and outside gov-
ernment and non-government agents largely explain the differ-
ences in degree of elite capture and its outcomes in the two cases.
Keywords Corruption . Elite capture . Local government .
Conservation and development interventions . Sumatra
Introduction
This article examines conservation and development projects
in two villages, Ladang Palembang and Bandar Agung, in the
Lebong district of Sumatra’s Bengkulu province with a focus
on leadership, elite capture and corruption. The article com-
pares how government and non-government organization
(NGO) funded conservation and development projects were
managed during the decade following implementation of
Indonesia’s 1999 decentralization legislation. In examining
aspects of elite control and elite capture, this paper considers
primarily the roles of village officials and secondarily that of
external actors including district level government authorities,
national park and forestry department officials, and NGO or-
ganizers, summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
Following Dasgupta and Beard (2007), this paper distin-
guishes between ‘elite control’ over project decisions that en-
sure access to project benefits by non-elites, and ‘elite capture’
of project benefits, which refers to “the process by which [local
elites] dominate and corrupt community-level planning and
governance” (Dasgupta and Beard 2007: 244, note 1)1. While
the use of positions of influence to benefit materially from
development projects is usually treated negatively as elite cap-
ture, there are members of these village elite groups who use
their control over projects to benefit the wider community. It is
argued here that the considerable degree of disaffection among
ordinary villagers and friction between different groups among
village elites concerning control of resources in these two cases
give good reason to consider the conditions which promote the
positive engagement of elite roles, as discussed in the Warren
and Visser (2016) introduction to this themed issue.
In the Sumatran cases elite capture included examples of
channelling development project benefits directly to members
of the village elite (mainly the village head and other officials),
demanding kickbacks from project budgets, and extracting
illegal payments from community members in order to access
benefits designed to alleviate poverty. Nonetheless, elite
1 Dutta (2009) considers that elite capture occurs when there is a bias in
the selection of project beneficiaries, such that only some groups benefit.
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control of projects was not always associated with corruption,
but in some circumstances lead to positive outcomes in which
there was substantial community-wide benefit.
This article will also examine how beneficial elite control
has operated in the implementation of community forest and
water conservation projects (funded by the Ford Foundation
through its local Sumatran NGO counterpart WARSI) in
Ladang Palembang village, and less effectively in several vil-
lage infrastructure development projects funded through the
Indonesian government’s PNPM (National Community
Empowerment Program) in both villages. These projects have
checks and balances built into planning and implementation
processes that are supposed to foster local empowerment and
prevent corruption (McCarthy et al. 2014: 238, Fig. 10.1).
Elite control and elite capture have to be understood in the
context of what one member of the village elite described as the
“intertwining circles of leadership, family and money” so evi-
dent in Bandar Agung village (interview with AR, 8.04.2011).
Because of the extraordinary stranglehold of particular political
patronage relationships in Bandar Agung, both members of the
elite who were outside the group controlling project funds and
non-elite community members felt themselves powerless to
affect the abuse of authority in Bandar Agung. The same disaf-
fected member of the elite put it like this: “When we talk about
justice we can only talk about applying the rules of government
more fairly. But how can we do this if we are not members of
the [village] government?” (idem).
Elite capture has been facilitated by decentralization policies
in Indonesia which gave local elites increased access to re-
sources, and paradoxically by the role of the political party sys-
tem that has emerged since the end of authoritarian rule in 1998,
although this has been more evident in studies at district than at
village level (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005; Aspinal and Mietzner
2010; Van Klinken 2012)2. In some cases it is possible to track
the direct connection between elite capture of resources through
official positions and corruption. The cuts or kickbacks taken
from externally funded project budgets, (which amount to 5 to
20 % in the two villages) can clearly be defined as corruption.
They occurred because of formal capture of the management of
these projects by the village head in each case. Elite capture and
corruption of external and government funded conservation and
development projects were found to have occurred more fre-
quently during the second term of office of the headmen of both
villages in this study. Villagers explained this increase in corrupt
behavior as a reflection of the need to accumulate wealth and pay
off political debts while they were still in office and had oppor-
tunities to do so.
2 The national PNPM community development program intentionally
bypassed district-level government in making payments directly to vil-
lage level work groups for community projects that were meant to be
determined at village meetings. See McCarthy et al. (2014) for details
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Both villages are located in Lebong district, which borders on
Kerinci Selabat National Park (TNKS) created in 1996 (see map,
Fig. 1). Villagers still burn the forest for new gardens inside park
buffer zones, while the park itself is a source of valuable forest
products for both communities3. Despite criticism of their ma-
nipulation of development funds, the headmen of both villages
were seen to be supportive of conservation campaigns to protect
forest remnants. In Ladang Palembang an adat (customary law)
based Village Regulation established rules for Village Protected
Forests (Perda 2004a, re-issued as Perda 2009), and in Bandar
Agung a customary (adat) ceremony to preserve the balance of
nature and provide ritual security against occasional sightings of
Sumatran tigers around the village was revived (Sastro 2006).
Actual enforcement of laws on exploitation of forest products
from the national park was a more complicated matter.
The sections that follow trace the roles of the two village
heads and other agents in the implementation of conservation
and development initiatives in the villages of Ladang
Palembang and Bandar Agung, Sumatra. Research in the
two villages was conducted over several months during
2010 and 2011 as part of a comparative research project on
social capital and natural resource management. A survey of
forty households, selected by geographically stratified random
sampling, was carried out in each of the two Sumatran vil-
lages. Survey questions covered basic demographic and socio-
economic information for each household, as well as probing
attitudes to local government and natural resource manage-
ment issues, and assessing levels of participation in decision-
making and conservation and development program interven-
tions (see Tables 1 and 2). In-depth interviews were subse-
quently carried out with key informants representing the range
of social groups and leadership positions in each community4.
NGO Engagement and Protected Forests in Ladang
Palembang Village
Findings from the research project survey (n = 40) carried out
in Ladang Palembang village in early 2010, showed that most
respondents valued WARSI’s conservation and social action
program. WARSI (the Indonesian Conservation Community),
a local NGO, worked in partnership with the Ford
Foundation’s Community Based Forestry Management
(CBFM) program on social development and conservation
in four Sumatran provinces5. A key focus of these programs
3 468 villages across four provinces share borders with the TNKS buffer
zone. In Lebong district, 48 villages are located along the borders of the
Park, which takes up 59 % of the district's area (113,512 ha) (See
Figure 1).
4 All interviews referred to in this paper were recorded in Indonesian and
Rejang languages and later translated into English by the author, with the
assistance of Nurkholis Sastro for Rejang language interviews.
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in Ladang Palembang was the creation of three protected for-
est areas, and a water supply project for the village sourced
from one of the protected springs. A village regulation was
written with WARSI’s assistance for that purpose (Perda
2004a).
According to WARSI’s former regional director, Ladang
Palembang village was chosen because of the need to resolve
the conflict over a new transmigrant settlement in the upland
areas of the village affecting the buffer zone of the national
park in 2000–2001. Supported by the Bengkulu Peasants’
Union (StaB), indigenous hamlets there were reluctant to give
up their land (Bachriadi 2011). WARSI also campaigned suc-
cessfully to have the licenses of three sawmills in the buffer
zone cancelled, effectively aborting the transmigrant settle-
ment6. Most of the old growth forest outside the national park
had been logged in the mid-1980s by a private company clear-
ing land for a rubber plantation. Alongside protecting impor-
tant watershed forests overlapping with the national park
boundaries, WARSI also wanted to implement a community
development program to improve village livelihoods adjacent
to the park buffer zone by providing productive rubber seed-
lings and candlenut (Aleurites molucana) trees. The Ladang
Palembang village head was involved in both projects:
Before I had not given any thought to conservation.
Then WARSI asked us: “Why don’t you make a village
[protected] forest and an adat [protected] forest?” That
was in 2002. We got together the well-known commu-
nity leaders7 from the village to talk about how to pro-
tect nature, particularly our springs. The local leaders
agreed that if the forest were cleared we would lose
our springs. We heard a story about how a village head
had stopped an illegal logger – presumably using per-
suasion8. This was an example we needed to follow. We
did a survey of our forests involving women, youth,
6 Without permanent housing or land, all but a few transmigrant families
had left the area by the end of 2003.
7 That is "people who are respected and who have followers in the village
because of their honesty, care and involvement in the community"
(Sastro, pers. com., 1.04. 2011).
8 WARSI’s approach was to use persuasion; the environmental action
group WALHI used advocacy of conflict cases through the media and
the courts (Sastro, pers. com., 23.04.2011).
Fig. 1 Map of Lebong District (Bengkulu Province) research villages and forest areas
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farmers, village officials and the village council [BPD].
Wewent and put numberedmetal plates on trees to mark
the village protected forest boundaries. WARSI helped
us with GPS mapping. When we had finished the map-
ping, we invited our adat people to make a regulation.
(Interview with village head in Ladang Palembang,
7.03.2010)
After the boundary mapping, a village regulation was
drafted with the participation of various stakeholders includ-
ingWARSI, village officials, the newly elected village council
(BPD) and several women’s groups, to protect the three blocks
of village protected forest (Perda 2004a)9. The regulation
specified customary adat fines for any unauthorized cutting
of trees or new garden plots in these forests that were to be
reported to the village head10. The new village regulation also
set out permitted uses of the protected forests, including
collecting fruits, medicinal plants and honey “without
destroying or cutting down trees, but ensuring their protec-
tion.” Farmers with gardens bordering the village protection
forests who burned off ferns and alang-alang grass (Imperata
cylindrica) are required to build a two-meter wide ditch to
prevent the fire from spreading. They also had to re-plant
critically degraded areas (Perda 2004a, §2).
The same village regulation applied to gardens remaining
inside the national park and village protected forest after
boundaries were drawn. Although technically illegal under
national regulations, maintaining gardens inside the national
forest was a local compromise whereby these pre-existing
gardens were tolerated, but could not be enlarged, nor new
ones created. Cultivators were required to plant timber species
and to protect the forest. The cultivators could keep their rights
to forest products (such as wild honey and forest fruits), but
they did not have the right to cut down the trees that produced
these products. Article 7 (Perda 2004a) stipulated that cutting
down old or unproductive trees required permission and that
replacement trees had to be six months old. Gardens located in
so-called regeneration areas could remain, and any cutting of
trees could only take place with permission of the local
Farmer’s Conservation Group which was set up in Ladang
Palembang village as part of WARSI’s conservation program.
The village regulation governed water use as well as land.
Article 6 specifically banned the taking of fish from the
Ketaun River using illegal methods such as poison, electric
shock, and dynamite. Sastro (2003a, 2003b) reports that wom-
en cultivators were involved in evicting fish poachers using
these illegal methods on several occasions during this period,
indicating active local support for these environmental protec-
tion measures partially based on Rejang customary law. The
fact that women cultivators were the main arm of enforcement
was due to the importance of their local community cultiva-
tion groups, again based on Rejang adat11. The village regu-
lation on natural resources stipulated various sanctions if the
above rules were broken. Apart from the customary fines
mentioned above, there were also fines based on the price of
the timber that was cut, damaged or burnt. Gardens illegally
opened in the village protected forest had to be restored to
their original boundaries. Heavy fines were stipulated for kill-
ing fish using any illegal means12.
How successful was the application of these sanctions in
preventing illegal cultivation and illegal logging within these
newly designated village protected forests? And what was the
role of village leadership and village elites in this process? In
fact, the attempt by WARSI to re-establish Rejang customary
law (adat) penalties to protect the village’s natural resources
was never seriously enforced by the official village head or the
village customary leadership after the WARSI programme
ended. What it did do was raise the awareness of the impor-
tance of conservation amongst farmers. WARSI’s attempt to
give a revived role to an Adat Council to hear cases of
breaches of natural resource management rules was also
intended to raise awareness of conservation issues (Tim
Fasilitasi CBFM 2003). In theory, according to the village
regulation, both the village head and local officials have to
examine each case (Perda 2004a). If there was proof of a
violation of forest protection regulations, the matter was hand-
ed over to the AdatCouncil, comprising Rejang elders, village
officials and Islamic leaders, which convened a public meet-
ing to hear the case13.
In the only recorded case heard by the village Adat
Council, the WARSI-initiated Farmers’ Conservation Group
had reported a local upland farmer named Rahman for cutting
down two trees (three cubic meters of timber). Rahman
confessed, explaining that his economic situation was diffi-
cult, his wife was sick, and he was two months in arrears with
unpaid school fees. A witness confirmed his situation. An
9 The national park administration had not responded to the village’s
proposal to create new areas of protected village forest at the time field-
work ended. However, local people have generally respected these com-
mitments regardless of lack of upper level government recognition.
10 The Rejang adat penalties used by the village government for illegally
cutting trees was a 2–3 meter roll of white cloth, 16 kg of rice, and the
conduct of a community adat ritual meal to restore harmony in the village.
The official village regulation stipulated a penalty of two tins of rice
(article 9), which amounts to 32 kg. Also, the illegal logger had to reim-
burse the village for the value of the illegally cut timber.
11 Ladang Palembang village has four such cultivation groups involving
women from settlement communities of 4–6 dwellings, often little more
than huts, located throughout village uplands. Led by local Rejang wom-
en, they cultivate gardens, collect firewood and edible forest plants, and
catch fish in the Ketaun river. WithWARSI support, they reacted strongly
to livelihood threats from outside poachers (Sastro 2003a: 28).
12 If the illegal fishermen used violence resulting in death, the fine was
one house, equivalent to IDR 8million rupiah (USD 660). If animals were
killed they had to be replaced. If fish were killed the fine was the value of
one quarter of a house, or 2 million rupiah (Perda 2004a : clause 13).
13 The Adat Council chair was an elder of the lowland hamlets, reflecting
their control of formal village institutions.
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accomplice admitted showing Rahman the location of the
trees and introducing him to the Chinese middleman who
bought the logs, but denied any knowledge of where they
had been cut. The Adat Council chairperson, although ac-
knowledging that the accused was motivated by economic
hardship, gave his advice based on the wider significance of
the environmental protection issues concerned in the case:
The area where the act occurred is a source of springs;
the steep terrain is prone to landslides, it is the home of
rare animals, etc., and if the environment is damaged, it
will destroy the balance of nature that will be a disaster
for many people. (Minutes of the Adat Council 2002)
After hearing a plea for a light sentence because of the personal
circumstances of the accused, and the fact that he admitted his
wrongdoing, the AdatCouncil imposed fines in kind and directed
Rahman to donate the value of the timber he had cut to the village
to be used to rehabilitate the village protection forest.
The example shows howWARSI promoted the integration
of customary, Islamic and state law and succeeded in raising
awareness of the importance of conservation in the communi-
ty, particularly the connection between forest protection and
water security. The Adat Council regulations specified that
while existing gardens within the village protection forest
could still be cultivated, they could only be planted with orig-
inally wild but now cultivated perennial rainforest trees like
rubber, durian, jackfruit, or a bean called petai (Parkia
speciosia). Cutting trees for timber or clearing land by slash
and burn techniques were not allowed. As noted above, this
customary (adat) rule was written into official village regula-
tions, which protected the existing cultivation rights of the
community but at the same time prevented the opening up
of new gardens within the protection forest. Hamlets near
the park were asked to report any illegal cutting of timber,
the person doing it, and the position on the protection forest’s
boundary (Ladang Palembang village head, 7.3.2010).
WARSI’s knowledge-sharing approach had several results
in Ladang Palembang and nearby villages. One was the broad
realization that forests were needed to protect water sources,
and that the village could impose adat penalties on people
cutting timber in village protected forest areas, with or without
district-level endorsement. WARSI’s programs consciously
engaged both the elite and non-elite members of the commu-
nity. The WARSI sponsored forest conservation program of
measuring and marking the Village Protected Forest bound-
aries emphasized the link between protecting forests and water
sources. This knowledge sharing, formalized in the writing of
the village regulations and in the settlement of village bound-
ary disputes, helped protect the national park (TNKS) as well
as local water sources. WARSI was behind the cancellation of
sawmill permits and supported protest actions by women cul-
tivators against illegal fishing.
WARSI support for poor village women in enforcing reg-
ulations against damaging fishing practices that threatened
their livelihood indicates the complex equity challenges facing
conservation interventions. Strict conservation measures dis-
proportionately affected poor upland forest-dependent Rejang
hamlets more than they did the more prosperous lowlandWest
Javanese hamlets. On the other hand, protection of riverine
resources was important to the upland subsistence base. As
part of their advocacy for natural resource management, the
presence of WARSI undoubtedly helped empower upland
women to act against outside poachers using damaging fishing
methods, and suggests the wider influence and potential em-
powerment through conservation interventions that meet up
with local needs and management practices. The Adat
Council’s effectiveness was probably connected to WARSI’s
presence in the village; after the project ended, there are no
records of further meetings.
Elite Capture and Environmental Regulation
in Bandar Agung Village
State law prohibits logging and other forest product collection
in national parks. However, locals regularly enter the national
park to collect forest products for which there are ready mar-
kets, and villagers never report illegal collection of forest
products by other villagers. Illegal exploitation is driven by
poverty and market demand (Ribot and Peluso 2005), and is
maintained by cultivating collusive relations with local au-
thorities responsible for reporting and enforcement.
Sapwood or eaglewood (gaharu) is a globally highly val-
ued forest product used to make perfumes and incense, hence
locally much sought after because of its high price. But its
collection requires cutting out the sapwood that is infected
by a parasitic mould. Exported to China and Thailand for
the cosmetic industry, the tree has to be cut down to obtain
the sapwood, which is sold in the district town of Muara
Aman to middlemen for between IDR 5–15 million (USD
416–1250) per kg.
The headman of Bandar Agung acknowledged that the
collection of all forest products was illegal in protected nation-
al parks. But he claimed to be both unable and unwilling to
stop it. He described his attitude to enforcement when a group
of outside collectors from the Lebong district market – three
hours away – stopped at his house on their way to the national
park to search for this increasingly scarce and highly profit-
able sapwood:
Giving them warnings will only make things difficult for
us. They’ll still go into the forest. So it’s better if we don’t
know. Then it means they go there at their own risk. Even
if we have a responsibility to tell them [its wrong], they
will still do damage to the forest. So it’s better that we
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don‘t know about it … The village headman is a leader,
not a law enforcement officer. (Interview with Bandar
Agung village head, 28.03.2011)
The village head claimed that admonishing the sapwood
collectors would not work. The price is a big incentive for
those determined to exploit the increasingly scarce trees, and
they have no other source of livelihood as profitable. Instead
of bypassing his house to get to the Park, better that they enter
and leave along the track below his house.
I feel bad about what they are doing. But there is no easy
way out. We want a positive outcome. They know that
what they are doing is breaking the law. We can warn
them, but when they are determined to go there, there’s
no point. It’s better to just let them go. If I warn them
they will tell their friends “If you go to the village head’s
house you’ll get a warning”. Next time they go into the
Park, they will use the track along the river to avoid
meeting me. So nothing is achieved. These five men
have brought provisions to live in the park for two
weeks. [If] they don’t report what they are doing to us,
then we aren’t responsible, and we don’t have to warn
them or report them [to the police]. (Interview with
Bandar Agung village head, 28.03.2011)
Indeed state law enforcement can be problematic in
Indonesian villages. The police in Indonesia are based at sub-
district level and do not have any direct village level represen-
tation. The village head would have to bring the sapwood
offenders to the police office in the subdistrict centre of
Tapus (see Fig. 1) in order for them to be charged with illegal
activities. Tapus is one hour’s drive away on an unsealed road
which becomes impassable and dangerous after heavy rains.
He would have to provide proof of identity and a witness. And
he would need to bring to the police the confiscated sapwood
as evidence that they were stealing forest products.
The problem of enforcing conservation regulations is an
issue throughout Indonesia’s vast, but rapidly degrading, forest
estate. Park boundaries are long and porous. The Kerinci
Selabat National Park borders 4 neighboring provinces and 13
districts. With a total boundary of 2638 km, park authorities
have a huge task (Taman Nasional Kerinci Sebelat 2007; see
map, Fig. 1). Bandar Agung village has park boundaries on
three sides. Park rangers located at the TNKS headquarters on
the opposite northeast side of the park in faraway Jambi prov-
ince do not have an office in Lebong District. Consequently,
coordinated actions against taking protected species by the
Park’s authorities in surrounding villages are often impractical.
In poor regions such as this, village officials and even de-
partment authorities sometimes ignore infractions out of sym-
pathy with the situation of poor rural people. Two Bandar
Agung villagers, who make a livelihood from selling live
songbirds caught in the National Park are an example. They
were from two of the poorest families in the village, and the
headman of Bandar Agung made no attempt to stop them
(Lucas 2011). In return for looking the other way, authorities
would receive illegal payments from those whose exploitation
of park resources were unhindered. Although it is not clear
whether this was the case with the Bandar Agung villagers
who engaged in songbird collecting, undoubtedly the Bandar
Agung village head was receiving kickbacks from the outside
collectors of the lucrative gaharu sapwood. Otherwise there
would have been no reason for him to entertain visits from
these illegal collectors, and ignore (or encourage) their dis-
crete use of the walking track below his house while refusing
to report their activities. Overseeing illegal forest product col-
lection was completely consistent with his blatant extractions
from development projects within the village, facilitated also
by collusive patronage relationships he was able to maintain
with higher-level authorities in the District and Forest
Department offices.
Elite Control of aWater Supply Development Project
in Ladang Palembang
Until recently very few villages in Indonesia had access to a
domestic water system (known locally as PAM Desa)14 and
most relied on wells or streams. During the WARSI project
period (2001–2004) there were discussions about the problem
of local springsmademuddy during the wet season and drying
up in the dry season. A domestic water supply piped to all six
hamlets in the village from five different springs was planned
as one of theWARSI projects (Perda 2004b). The 2004 village
regulation then was extended to become the basis for a
National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM) fi-
nanced village water supply scheme in 2008. The scheme
involved construction of a holding dam at the spring, a 2 km
underground pipeline to the village, with water hydrants to
each group of 4–6 households connecting running water to
80 % (92) of the 114 lowland households. Each household is
charged a fee of IDR 5000 per month, regardless of the
amount of water used. The project was built and run by the
village head’s two brothers-in-law, who are credited with pro-
viding transparency in the construction of the project, as well
as accountability and technical management in the subsequent
running of the scheme, for which there were no regulations in
PNPM guidelines.
The planning of the project went through the required
PNPM participatory procedures. However, because of their
isolation from the centre of village power, and the location
14 Since PNPM began, some 16,000 villages in Indonesia have built
domestic water systems run by local communities (G. Acciaoli, pers.
com., 7.07.2014).
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of the spring to be used, the three upland Rejang hamlets were
not included in the PNPM stage of the water supply project.
This was due partly to the PNPM consultation process, which
villagers in the three upland hamlets felt had left them out. The
members of these upland hamlets claim they were not invited
to meetings, while the PNPM village facilitator said that when
a meeting was held in an upland hamlet, there were too few
attending to make a quorum, leading the inexperienced young
facilitator to (wrongly) conclude that they “did not care about
PNPM”15.
Ladang Palembang village is divided between two main
social groups: the descendants of pre-war colonial
transmigrants fromWest Java who live in three lowland ham-
lets, and the local Rejang people inhabiting the three upland
hamlets who cultivate subsistence dryland crops and practice
occasional slash and burn agriculture. The upland Rejang peo-
ple live in scattered settlements, speak the Rejang language,
have their own prayer houses, and only go to the village centre
to take children to school or collect monthly rice rations.
Lowland views on the Rejang uplanders are usually negative.
Village officials are all members of the lowland pre-war
transmigrant elite. The marginality of the upland hamlets in
Ladang Palembang was a significant issue in both the NGO
sponsored conservation and government PNPM development
programs. Sponsoring the revival of the village Adat Council
through the WARSI intervention attempted to bridge the gap
between the two ethnic groups, but, as mentioned earlier, no
further meetings were recorded after WARSI left the village in
2006. The subsequent failure of the PNPM project facilitator
to press for their inclusion in the water supply development
program, reflects what upland hamlet dwellers have long felt
as an ongoing disregard for their welfare by lowland village
officials. On the other hand, inclusion of lowland women in
externally facilitated conservation and development programs
seems to have established important new participatory prac-
tices. The solar panel program for upland hamlets (not a
PNPM project) can be seen as compensation by the village
head for the upland hamlets’ exclusion from PNPM water
supply project benefits.
With respect to financial management, unlike PNPM pro-
jects in Bandar Agung village to be discussed below, transpar-
ency mechanisms, including broad-based distribution of re-
sponsibilities and multiple checks and balances during con-
struction of the Ladang Palembang water system, were rela-
tively effective and prevented officials makingmoney from its
construction. During the construction stage the project man-
ager refused to pay a 5% kickback to the village headman, his
brother-in-law, although this was to have repercussions the
following year. He also made every effort, in line with
PNPM principles, to employ women as much as possible dur-
ing the construction phase16.
The sustainability of a village water supply system requires
planning, transparency and accountability not only in con-
struction, but also in the ongoing collection and management
of water fees, and in remuneration for those who maintain the
system. Round the clockmaintenance work was carried out by
AS (another brother-in-law of the village head, from the same
elite family that had held the office of village head for many
decades), with a husband and wife team, also from among
lowland elite families, collecting and recording water
payments.
The village water system is run by a committee of three
members - me, D, and her husband, H.We holdmonthly
meetings at the village office. Only half of the 92 fam-
ilies that have connected to the system usually attend.
The agenda including what kinds of mutual help
(gotong royong) for maintenance will be discussed.
The secretary, D [who also performs the role of treasurer
at the request of the women who wanted a woman to
look after the money], reports on income and expendi-
ture. If we want to change the water fees, the regulation
has to be changed which means a new meeting. In
May 2009 a meeting was held attended by 41 sub-
scribers. I got selected by lottery. (Interview with AS
in Ladang Palembang, 14.03.2010)17
The PNPM village water system started operations in
May 2009, with 88 subscribers; by March 2010 there were
91, of which 14 (12%) were behind in their payments by one
or two months. The rule is that if they are in arrears more than
three months their access to water will be disconnected18.
Village water supply systems are high maintenance pro-
jects. The Ladang Palembang scheme was an example of ben-
eficial elite control, with one of the headman’s brothers-in-law
(AH) building the project and the other brother-in-law (AS)
managing it. The latter maintained the pipes and hydrants for a
monthly wage of IDR 150,000 (USD 12.50)19. There was a
separate budget of IDR 100,000 (USD 8.30) for parts. The
15 Interview with the village PNPM project facilitator in Ladang
Palembang, 6.3.2010. On these lowland and upland communities, see
Prodolliet and Heinzpeter (1992), and Schneider (1995).
16 Active participation of women in decision-making was prescribed in
the PNPM program (McCarthy et al. 2014:251). Earlier, WARSI had also
encouraged women's involvement in both conservation and village gov-
ernance roles including drafting the village regulation (WARSI 2005;
Sastro 2003a; b).
17 Under the local lottery system, names of those who are interested in a
position are written down on pieces of paper, and then lots are drawn. It
wasn’t an appointed position, but not exactly elected either.
18 There was an initial connection fee of IDR 10,000 (USD 0.83) to the
water system. The management committee set monthly water rates
(payments) at IDR 5000 (USD 0.40). Monthly water payments in a large
household in the district capital of Muara Aman at this time were IDR
20,000 (Sastro, pers. com., 2.05.2015).
19 The Bengkulu regional minimum wage in 2010 was IDR 780,000 per
month (USD 65).
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treasurer of the water supply system of Ladang Palembang
village kept the register of connected households, which
showed who was behind with monthly water payments, and
she managed the maintenance budget together with AS. The
treasurer herself was a member of the economic elite and
reputedly owned a hectare of irrigated rice fields. As in the
case of Ladang Palembang’s Village Protected Forests, the
village regulation on water was important to what lowland
villagers saw as a fair management system20. For example,
in March 2010 there were jokes about the village secretary’s
unpaid water fees – he was two months in arrears. According
to the water regulation, if fees remained unpaid after three
months, water supply would be disconnected. Asked how
water payments were collected from village officials, the wa-
ter system treasurer said:
When we collect water payments, the village secretary,
who hasn’t paid since January, is treated in the sameway
as everyone else. After three months of non-payment
their water is cut off, regardless of who it is or what their
position is. Our job is what’s important. Because there
was no regulation before, the village officials could do
what they liked. Now that we have the village regula-
tions as the mandate for action, we’re not afraid to ask
people to pay, whoever they are. The village secretary is
a village leader, and he’s setting a bad example. It’s as if
he is telling people “It’s OK not to pay”, or he’s telling
them how to get into a debt trap. (Interview with secre-
tary of Ladang Palembang village water scheme, 15.3.
2010)
The conflict between the village head and his two brothers-
in-law over control of the PNPM water system mentioned
earlier shows that ‘the’ village elite is not a politically consol-
idated entity and that intra-elite rivalry may contribute to more
open processes and better governance. The power play be-
tween the headman and AH, his older brother-in-law who
ran the PNPM water system project in the village, illustrates
this:
Whenwe had the first [PNPM] village planningmeeting
for 2009, I was going to continue as leader of the work
group. But the village head didn’t attend the meeting. I
was told later that he went to the PNPM subdistrict
office, saying: “If AH becomes the leader of the work
group [again] I won’t sign off on the village planning
meeting.” The subdistrict facilitator asked me what was
going on in the village as the headmen had come to the
subdistrict office, and complained that I was “too inflex-
ible”. At the second PNPM village meeting while the
village head was speaking I cut him off21 and told the
meeting that I was resigning, although I was older than
him and he had no power over me. When the PNPM
Team came from Jakarta they told me that the headman
hadn’t signed off on my project report, because the vil-
lage stamp had “gone missing”. (Interview with HK,
Ladang Palembang PNPM work group leader,
29.03.2010)
The Ladang Palembang village head then appointed anoth-
er (younger) brother-in-law as leader of the project work
group who gave him the kickback of 5 % on all materials
for the PNPM village laneways project (Interviewwith former
work group leader in Ladang Palembang, 7.04. 2010). A
WARSI activist had this to say about the performance of the
Ladang Palembang head in the village election of 2007:
The village head is a rather closed person, not transpar-
ent as far as financial reporting is concerned. He will
grab money from a project if he doesn’t have any. And
he chooses who has access to projects. It’s not an open
process, but is controlled by himself and two of his
wealthy supporters. But when he has money he is gen-
erous with people who need it. (Pers. com. with ex-
WARSI organizer, 05.03.2010)
Corruption and Elite Capture in Bandar Agung
Development Projects
While the situation in Ladang Palembang village development
projects exhibits both ‘elite control’ with significant benefits
to the wider population and some ‘capture’ on the part of the
village head, in Bandar Agung village elite control has be-
come synonymous with systematic capture and corruption.
This can take various forms. Firstly, the village head demands
illegal payments from villagers to qualify for benefits from
provincial and district projects that are meant to be free.
Public grants and benefits for which Bandar Agung villagers
were forced to make a cash payment to the headman included
provision of gas cookers (the compulsory contribution was
IDR 30,000 [USD 2.50]); a solar panels program (IDR 150,
000 [USD 12.50)22; and monthly allocations of 15 kg rice
under the ‘rice for the poor’ program (IDR 15000 [USD
1.25]). In Bandar Agung, the rice for the poor distribution is
conducted on the front veranda of the village head’s house.
According to villagers, 175 kg of undistributed rice was later
20 Upland villagers also needed a water system but were left out for
reasons discussed above.
21 Cutting off the village head while he was speaking at a public meeting
even by someone with the same or higher status was unheard of, and
indicated how angry HK was.
22 At this time USD 1.00 = IDR 12,000.
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sold off, while two of the poorest families in the village (the
songbird-catcher families mentioned above) were refused rice
because they could not afford the cash payment demanded.
The village head can extort these illegal payments because,
as official administrative village chief, he has free reign with
project implementation in the village in the absence of mean-
ingful oversight on the part of district level authorities, or
through internal village administrative accountabilities
(McCarthy et al. 2014: 255–256). The original decentralization
legislation (Law 22/ 1999) had provided for checks and bal-
ances through an independently elected village council (BPD).
With the rationale that this had lead to conflict between execu-
tive and legislative arms, the revised regional government Law
32/ 2004 reversed this by replacing elected councils with
appointed consultation boards with restricted authority. The
Indonesian government’s community empowerment program,
PNPM, was intended to have a broadly based management
system, beyond executive control, but in varying degrees it
proved not to be immune to entrenched forms of elite capture.
Outright elite capture also occurred when the village head
and a small circle of his supporters directly appropriated com-
munity development project benefits. For example, cattle were
distributed to those with family ties, then supporters and
cronies. It is widely remarked that those who receive such pro-
ject benefits are ‘KSK’ (Kelop Sama Kades), ‘in cahoots with
the headman’. When Bandar Agung village received 18 cows
as part of a government cattle rearing project, the headman
reputedly took 8 animals for himself. The remaining cows were
distributed among village officials and relatives (Interview with
former Bandar Agung village official, 16.4.2011). The head-
man illegally determined the distribution of project benefits as
well as work group membership for the government’s PNPM
community empowerment program according to this ‘KSK’
principle. In Bandar Agung out of 20 new houses built for the
first phase of a new village transmigrant housing scheme, 8
were allocated to the Bandar Agung headman’s family and to
village officials who were the headman’s cronies. Not all offi-
cials are involved with these illicit arrangements, but even those
who resist, stay quiet because their positions are on the line.
Why is there no resistance from within the village or de-
mand for accountability from any superior levels of govern-
ment to date? The Bandar Agung village head had manipulat-
ed the 2001 village elections by stacking the village election
committee with his own supporters, so he could alter the vil-
lage electoral roll, allowing non-residents who cultivated plots
of land in the village to vote. (He allegedly threatened that he
would burn down their field huts if they did not vote for him.)
He also got the village election committee to agree that house-
hold heads could vote on behalf of other household members
eligible to vote, which is illegal. Reputedly, some of the ‘orig-
inal’ villagers set fire to his house in protest over the election
result. These incidents have had a lasting effect on village
governance, as no one is prepared to openly oppose the village
head, despite regarding him as having “no moral authority”.
(Interviews in Bandar Agung village, March 2011).
The Bandar Agung village head also introduced the prac-
tice of taking a cut from all village officials’ salaries during his
first term of office. At the end of every quarter he would go to
the subdistrict office and ‘collect’ the wages of village staff
without their authority:
He knew from the subdistrict treasurer the date we were
going to be paid, and he went off by himself and col-
lected our wages. When he got back here we should
have received IDR 450,000 but he took IDR 150,000
for ‘transport expenses’. When we complained he derid-
ed us saying: ‘You don’t work, but you are paid a salary
just to sleep’. (Interview with ES, a former Bandar
Agung village official, 03.04.2011)
This practice would not be difficult to remedy, villagers
say, if the wages of village officials were paid directly into
bank accounts. But in a remote village like Bandar Agung
even salaried officers find it inconvenient to store money in
a distant bank. The kickback culture between village and dis-
trict offices is strongly embedded across the country, where
elected officials condone it in return for support for their po-
litical re-election campaigns.
We have already described an example of ‘benevolent’ elite
control (Fritzen 2007: 1360) in the case of the water supply
development project in Ladang Palembang, where demands
for kickbacks faced resistance from the village head’s own
family members, and which for the main part was implement-
ed andmanaged in the public interest by other elite families. In
contrast, in Bandar Agung, corruption pervaded all of its de-
velopment projects. Clearly, such blatant misappropriation
and nepotism could not have continued without the collusion
of higher levels of government. The example of the PNPM
infrastructure project, including irrigation channels for rice
cultivation, illustrates the tangle of collusive arrangements
that made village level elite capture on this scale possible.
In 2007 Bandar Agung was given funding for ten PNPM
Infrastructure work groups (LKD) to build a bathing and toilet
facility and irrigation channels for the rice fields. The village
head called the work group leaders together and told them he
was going to manage nine of these groups himself for a 20%
‘fee’. Also, he told them that he would return the funds
budgeted (IDR 15million) for one ‘fake’ infrastructure project
that was not going to be implemented, to the PNPM subdis-
trict managers as a kickback. “This will ensure we get another
project next year,” he said23. The village head forged
23 Interview with a PNPM work group member who attended this meet-
ing, 19.04.2011. The communal toilet block remained permanently
locked and could not be used because no toilets were ever built inside
them (Interview with a Bandar Agung hamlet head, 12.03.2011).
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signatures on quarterly work group reports24. The 20 % fee
meant that projects ran out of money or had to be finished with
below standard materials, while the stipulated 10 % manage-
ment fee for LKD work group members was never paid. In
March 2010, the nine work groups were told that they would
be amalgamated under one group with the total budget to be
cut by 20%. As a result the road was shortened from 700 m to
500 m but this still left a budget shortfall. The headman told
the meeting that this had to be made up by “voluntary contri-
butions to costs from each work group” (Notebook of LKD
member copied on 19.04.2011)25.
The renovation of the suspension bridge over the Ketaun
River was another notorious case of project gouging. In 2011,
repairs to the bridge and renovated irrigation channels were
financed from the same PNPM Infrastructure program. The
village head accompanied the work groups to the bank in
Lebong district town to collect the project funds. When they
returned to the village he gave them a choice. Either hand over
the project money to him to manage or, if they wanted to run
the project by themselves, to pay him a kickback of 20 %.
PNPM management rules require that work groups manage
their own project expenditures, including contracts for con-
struction materials.
How Does Elite Capture Work?
In the undoubtedly extreme case of Bandar Agung village,
elite capture is characterized by two main issues: collusion
with higher levels of government and the inadequacy of civil
society organization. At district level there was a complete
lack of project monitoring and enforcement of regulations. A
former village official commented: “I said to the [Bandar
Agung] village head that what he was doing [managing work
group project funds himself] was against PNPM rules….
PNPM work groups were supposed to manage project fi-
nances and hire contractors themselves. His response was:
‘Who cares what the PNPM rules are?’” Project materials
were not brought from district-level wholesale suppliers ac-
cording to the cheapest quotes, but through favored supporters
or clients of the village head. Collusion with district officials
who share the same political party interests fuels the system-
atic nation-wide dimensions of local corruption. Lebong dis-
trict was no exception to this as the close relationship between
village and district heads was widely known. The latter
extended the former’s first term of office, and visited Bandar
Agung village during the headman’s election campaign for a
second term. The Bupati was also re-elected for a second term.
An inadequate foundation for institutional checks and bal-
ances within the village governance framework, in particular
since 2004, by the unelected and disempowered Village
‘Consultation’ Board (BPD), is another key part of the elite
capture scenario. Villagers’ responses to the incidents
discussed show that they regarded themselves as powerless
to oppose the Bandar Agung village head. Those leaders sen-
sitive to public opinion sometimes had to pay a financial price
for maintaining their reputations. Because of the illicit appro-
priation of project funds, on two occasions PNPM infrastruc-
ture project leaders in Bandar Agung had to use personal
funds to enable projects to be completed. The suspension
bridge renovations were short of IDR 8 million from a 30
million rupiah budget because of kickbacks.
Apart from the important structural issues just mentioned, it
is worth noting that the village head of Bandar Agung is lo-
cally known as both a clever speaker and a hospitable person.
But his friendly manners conceal resentments and grudges
against people who are opposed to his misappropriations, ma-
nipulation of work groups and favoritism towards relatives
and supporters who ‘agree’ with him. Because of these atti-
tudes, villagers hold long-term rancour and feel disconnected
from village governance (Interviews in Bandar Agung, April
2011). From his point of view, the thoroughly reprobate
Bandar Agung village head complained, “People don’t appre-
ciate what I have done, they are apathetic and never come to
meetings.” (Interview in Bandar Agung, 12.03.2011).
However, village meetings are few and far between. Only four
meetings were listed on the village notice board for the period
December 2009 – April 2010; three of these were scheduled
outside the village.
Is the situation regarding leadership and elite capture in
Bandar Agung an extreme case? Apparently so. When work
group members from the village met with work groups from
other villages in Lebong district, while collecting PNPM pro-
ject payment instalments from the bank in Muara Aman, they
found out that other village heads in the subdistrict did not
directly manage work group finances; rather they provided
supervision and coordination only under limited circum-
stances as provided by PNPM guidelines. However, because
of the extraordinary stranglehold of the network of corrupt
payments integrated into the personal and political system
the village head has created in Bandar Agung, there is nothing
in the short term they could do with this information.
Reporting the problem to the subdistrict PNPM officials
would not achieve anything, as they too were receiving kick-
backs from the village head. Regional journalists seldom
come to remote villages like Bandar Agung to report on vil-
lage level corruption because they prefer to cover governance
issues at district level, and because village level corruption is
24 When shown the work group LKD quarterly report, the work group
leader said: "These 16 signatures are fake” (Interview in Bandar Agung,
19.04.2011).
25 Reportedly, corruption of an earlier PNPM Infrastructure project in
Bandar Agung (2009) caused that project bridge to collapse after heavy
monsoonal rains because the bridge had not been built to specifications.
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regarded as relatively small compared to national cases, hence
not considered newsworthy (Bengkulu journalist, pers .com.,
29.10.2013).
That said, there is growing evidence that some of the mech-
anisms for dealing with local level corruption are taking effect.
Several village heads in Lebong district have been charged
with corruption of PNPM funds in recent times (WARSI ac-
tivist, pers. com., 18.10.2014). A national corruption investi-
gation into PNPM found that from 2004 to 2013, IDR 250
billion (USD 20.8 million] has been misappropriated by
groups receiving money through the program. Attempts to
use litigation have recovered IDR 2.2 billion (USD 183,300]
while IDR 33.3 billion (USD 2.77million) was “in the process
of being recovered”. In 2013 there were 22 cases of misuse of
PNPM funds in projects amounting tomore than IDR 1 billion
(USD 83.3 thousand). According to a national PNPM bureau-
crat and poverty reduction official in the Coordinating
Ministry for Public Welfare, these figures are small compared
with the annual PNPM budget of IDR 10–11 trillion (USD
833–916 million), or a total of IDR 56 trillion (USD 4.66
billion) of project expenditures so far26.
Policy Recommendations
The causes of elite capture are primarily due to the failures of
higher-level government oversight and the weakness of
countervailing village institutions to balance the power of vil-
lage elites. We have noted that the move towards village de-
mocratization began with the establishment of elected village
representative councils (BPD) under Law 22/1999 (Antlov
2002: 362–375). The process of expanding village council
participation in decision-making was reversed with the 2004
legislative revision, which reinstated a more or less monolithic
executive authority at the village level. If participation in vil-
lage governance is to increase, the first order of priority is to
strengthen democratization through formal and independent
election of hamlet heads and of village councils, whose legis-
lative parity with the village head must also be restored. The
new 2014 Village Law 6/ 2014 does provide for election of
BPDmembers, but does not yet clearly give the council equiv-
alent authority to the village head, and does not address the
role of constituent hamlets at which level most direct public
participation traditionally took place.
Secondly, there is the issue of transparency in both villages.
The fact that none of the village regulations are publicly avail-
able, for example on the village notice boards or in the village
office, needs addressing. Village officials say they do not have
copies, that they have been lent to other people, or were never
circulated. Because of WARSI’s involvement in making the
water regulation of Ladang Palembang village, there were
copies in this NGO’s archive. However, in Bandar Agung
village with no NGO program comparable toWARSI, records
could not be found. Recently the Minister for Village Affairs,
Underdeveloped Regions and Transmigration announced he
was sending a letter to all villages requiring that project ex-
penditure acquittals be posted on village notice boards, “so
people would know how the money was spent”27.
Thirdly, the role of the media in information dissemination,
particularly about corruption below the village level, needs to
be maintained, Falsifying work group reports recently
emerged as another form of corruption within PNPM projects,
according to a Bengkulu-based journalist who says that local
corruption of PNPM Infrastructure projects throughout the
province has been known for some time. Journalists and
NGO-based facilitators are meant to provide further check
and balance mechanisms, but sometimes also engage in col-
lusion. “From information that I have obtained, a number of
rogue [PNPM] facilitators have ‘taught’ local civil society
groups who are implementing PNPM programs how to cor-
rupt funds. It is not uncommon for facilitators themselves to
ask the work groups (LKD) for money to write their final
reports for them, when in fact these reports have to be written
by the work groups themselves” (Bengkulu journalist, pers.
com. 6.11.2013)28.
Fourthly, there is a need to strengthen NGO engagement at
village level and institutionalize more internal participatory
community monitoringmechanisms to increase accountability
of officials at the village level as well as of external authorities
at the subdistrict and district levels. In the neighboring prov-
ince of West Sumatra, independent monitoring of PNPM pro-
jects led to the development of a provincial monitoring system
to be implemented by NGOs “so that communities have safe
channels to frankly express their opinions, suggestions and
complaints” (Indrizal 2008; LASP 2007). Unfortunately, no
agreement has yet been reached on national standards or sys-
tems for independent project monitoring by NGOs in
Indonesia (Indrizal, pers. com., 3.12.2015). This process was
started at the national level by the Institute for Professional
Certification of Community Empowerment Facilitators (LSP-
FPM) during former President Yudhoyono’s last term of of-
fice, but became caught up in a tug of war over authority and
26 ‘Ratusan Miliar dana PNPM Mandiri di Korupsi’, Tempo, 8 March
2014. I am grateful to a local Bengkulu based journalist for this
information.
27 ‘Penyaluran hampir tuntas: penggunaan diawasi ketat’ Kompas
27.12.2015.
28 In North Bengkulu district, a PNPM facilitator charged IDR 3 million
(USD 250) to write a report for a village PNPMwork group leader. In his
defence the work group leader said he did not know how to write a project
report, and it would probably have cost him the same amount to go to the
subdistrict, find the documents and write the report himself. 'Terima
Beres, Bayar Rp.3 Juta', Rakyat Bengkulu 13.01. 2014.The local press
needs village level reporters to expose this corruption, although with the
gradual closing of district level newspapers, it is becoming more difficult
for the media to expose this kind of corruption.
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responsibility between the Ministry of Home Affairs (which
administered PNPM) and the new Ministry of Village Affairs,
Underdevelopment and Transmigration (Kemendes), which
under current President Jakowi, has different policy concerns
(creating ASEAN sponsored village economic communities
through direct grants for village enterprises). The community
development and empowerment funding previously proc-
essed through the PNPM program has now been incorporated
in modified form into the Village Law of 2014, substantially
increasing the power of the village head.
Conclusion
This paper provides insights into how elite control and elite
capture operate at village level and how internal relations of
rivalry and collusion are affected by external interventions
and political arrangements. Particularly in regard to develop-
ment projects, which typically involve access to substantial
resources, village heads in both study villages attempted to
tightly control access and distribution of benefits. Because of
the less concentrated organization of power amongst the prima-
ry elite family in Ladang Palembang village, however, the ex-
tent of capture by the village head was constrained. The PNPM
water project leader refused to give the village head (his broth-
er-in-law) the kickbacks demanded, while the running of the
water systemwasmanaged with generally acknowledged trans-
parency by another brother-in-law, known as an opponent of
the headman. In this case elite control, in Fritzen’s sense of
benevolent capture (Fritzen 2007: 1360), generally worked pos-
itively to achieve benefits for non-elite villagers.
By contrast in Bandar Agung development infrastructure
projects failed to meet participation and accountability objec-
tives because of the monopoly of power in the hands of the
village head and collusion with higher authorities. All villagers
knew about the corruption, but those who were not part of the
Bandar Agung village inner circle, had to be very careful about
what they said and to whom. Importantly, these examples of
corruption and elite capture of the PNPM infrastructure projects
in Bandar Agung village were unchallenged by overarching
government institutions and have been characterized by an ab-
sence of any meaningful participation in village monitoring,
despite community ‘capacity building’ and ‘empowerment’ be-
ing key objectives of this national community development
intervention. Notwithstanding PNPM program efforts to ensure
accountability, the village head ruthlessly shored up his position
using nepotism, cronyism and information control.
Especially after the revised local government law (UU 32/
2004) reduced the independent monitoring capacity of village
councils, village institutional structures facilitated elite control
and capture with power once more concentrated in the role of
village head, resulting in a situation where officials have a
strong sense of entitlement to moneymaking activities. This
takes place in the context of a political party system in which
elected district and provincial heads and assembly representa-
tives have made money politics an all-pervasive aspect of the
processes of democratization itself (McDonald 2014: 203).
While at the same time an independent anti-corruption agency
(KPK) attempts to tackle overt high-level corruption, its sys-
temic underpinnings remain unaddressed.
Both villages border the buffer zone of the Kerinci Selabat
National Park. In regard to conservation, the presence of an
outside NGO in the village of Ladang Palembang promoted
broader public participation in decision-making. WARSI used
village regulations as a means of empowering communities to
protect forests and water resources, and to manage projects
that benefited the community. WARSI expanded the tradition-
al roles of women as heads of cultivation groups. Women
participated in writing agreements on natural resources and
in managing village water system finances. They also became
village officials and council members. Incorporation of cus-
tomary practices involving the minority Rejang uplanders and
dominant West Javanese lowlanders have brought some,
though uneven, benefits to the indigenous upland minority.
While Ladang Palembang has village regulations (not al-
ways enforced) to protect its remaining threatened forest and
springs, there is still ample supply of water and timber in
Bandar Agung. The village head there claims that he wants
to protect the forest, and has urged the villagers to plant trees
through informal agreement with cultivators, although they
did not see the need to do so, because “there is plenty of timber
in the national park” (Interview with Bandar Agung villager,
10.4.2011). It is said the village head has let selected logging
trucks into village forest areas in the past but on a much small-
er scale than officials at the district level29. His attitude to
poaching in the national park hardly supports his pro-
conservation claims.
Two national level institutional shifts will potentially in-
crease the importance of village level governance for natural
resource management and community development. A recent
Constitutional Court ruling (2012) determining that custom-
ary adat forest does not come under the state forest regime
will place greater authority over forest resources in local hands
(Rachman and Siscawati 2014)30. And the new Village Law
29 Illegal logging is widespread in Lebong district, where an estimated
70 % of timber used for district development construction is processed
from illegally logged timber most of it coming from protected forest in
conservation areas. In 2007 the head of the local district forestry office
reported a member of the Lebong district assembly (DPRD) for his in-
volvement in illegal logging. One year later the district head’s adjutant
who was coordinator of the Lebong District Illegal Logging Control
Team, was himself caught by police while transporting illegally logged
timber to the site of the Bupati’s new official residence then under con-
struction (Lucas and Bachriadi 2009).
30 On the legal and political ramifications for Adat communities and the
Forestry Department to implement this ruling see Rachman and Siscawati
(forthcoming).
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(UU 6/ 2014), transferring community development funding
directly to village government, makes the importance of
checks and balances in local governance regimes a core issue
for forest conservation as well as for improving local liveli-
hoods sustainably. Leadership, public participation and mech-
anisms to ensure accountability will be even more critical to
these outcomes throughout Indonesia.
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